references to unfamiliar literatures, providing examples of how it can be done, on the other. I am well aware that the resulting history of monetary economics is something of a caricature. The reader must appreciate, however, that my purpose is not to critique the content of the history of monetary economics but to suggest that the domain of the field be extended.
One aspect of the neglect of Y is found in the juxtaposition of manifest and latent function. Emile Durkheim argued that when people enter a church their religious training leads them to feel in the presence of God. That is manifest function. Latent function is that that feeling leads to the reinforcement of the existing society, its structure of power and institutions (except insofar as religion is an instrument of change, which also happens through latent function) (Durkheim 1964; Merton 1949) . A related interpretive significance of latent/manifest function is given by Seaford (2004, 87; quoted in Tandy, 2005) .
The deepest problem confronting the social scientist, including the monetary economist, is that of how to deal, as an object of study, with the ways in which every society maintains and protects the performance of latent function and thereby achieves some degree of continuity. And the deepest, and most ironical, aspect of that problem is reconciling continuity with change. If one assumes that society is always in a process of becoming, each state of being, with its performance of latent function, morphs into and is eclipsed by the next state so that what constitutes continuity changes over time. Two other deep aspects, also ironical, are relevant. First, what is actually at stake in the conflict between continuity and change is not principally the array of substantive structural and other arrangements of society with which people can identify and in whose terms the conflict is understood. What is at stake is the conflict of mechanisms of change. There will be mechanisms of change; the question is, which will be dominant in the future -the mechanism of religion, or of government (public government), or of private government, or the market, belief system, technology, or, inter alia, groups of changeseeking or change-avoiding individuals. These are all artifacts and not elements of the natural order of things. Emphasis on continuity or change becomes a contest between, say, old and new dominant mechanisms of change. Second, the conflict of continuity with change is itself one aspect of the problem of order. The other aspects are the conflict of freedom (or autonomy) and control (or the conflict of freedom to and freedom from), and the conflict of equality and inequality (the problem of order is still more complicated; see Samuels 1996 and sources given therein). Also involved, because freedom for some often means control over others, are the questions, whose freedom, whose control. Pervading all of these conflicts, therefore, is the conflict over power, namely, the problem of the structure of decision-making and the bases thereof, with the object of fundamental decision-making the control of all these conflicts. Because monetary economists are not silent on how these conflicts should work out, they insinuate themselves into the working out of these conflicts, implicitly taking positions on them. The importance and relevance of these conflicts are two reasons for monetary economists to deal directly, as disinterestedly as possible, 1 and explicitly with them; that monetary economists already position themselves with respect to them is a third reason, with a fourth being intellectual honesty, and a fifth, candor.
